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Abstract
Evidence to inform decontamination practices at Ebola holding units (EHUs) and treatment
centres is lacking. We conducted an audit of decontamination procedures inside Connaught
Hospital EHU in Freetown, Sierra Leone, by assessing environmental swab specimens for
evidence of contamination with Ebola virus by RT-PCR. Swabs were collected following dis-
charge of Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) patients before and after routine decontamination.
Prior to decontamination, Ebola virus RNA was detected within a limited area at all bedside
sites tested, but not at any sites distant to the bedside. Following decontamination, few
areas contained detectable Ebola virus RNA. In areas beneath the bed there was evidence
of transfer of Ebola virus material during cleaning. Retraining of cleaning staff reduced evi-
dence of environmental contamination after decontamination. Current decontamination pro-
cedures appear to be effective in eradicating persistence of viral RNA. This study supports
the use of viral swabs to assess Ebola viral contamination within the clinical setting. We rec-
ommend that regular refresher training of cleaning staff and audit of environmental contami-
nation become standard practice at all Ebola care facilities during EVD outbreaks.
Introduction
Ebola virus is transmitted through direct contact with blood and other bodily fluids of an
infected person. Mechanisms of transmission through direct contact with infected patients and
body fluids have been studied in some depth but environmental transmission of the virus,
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whilst acknowledged to be important, is incompletely understood [1][2][3]. As a result, there is
limited evidence to guide environmental decontamination protocols.
Ebola Holding Units (EHUs) admit patients with suspected Ebola virus disease (EVD) for
EVD diagnostic testing before transferring negative patients to the general hospital environ-
ment and positive patients to Ebola Treatment Centres (ETCs). There is therefore the risk of
nosocomial transmission within EHUs and this has the potential to be high for three reasons.
Firstly, Ebola virus has been shown to survive for a potentially significant period of time [4];
studies in laboratory environments under optimal conditions have recovered viable virus from
solid surfaces from 8–26 days [5][6]. A recently published laboratory study using simulated
West African conditions matched for relative humidity and temperature levels, recovered via-
ble virus from surfaces after 5 days [7]. However, the different methodologies used in these
studies from the matrices used to suspend the virus to differing recovery techniques, limit their
applicability to the real world setting. Additionally, the clinical environment may be more hos-
tile to the virus, due, for example, to ultraviolet light, which is known to deactivate the virus
[8]. Secondly, studies have demonstrated that the infectious dose can be low (1–10 plaque
forming units) [9] although these studies were based on animal models with largely artificial
routes of administration of virus, such as intramuscular injection. Finally, EVD patients often
have prominent “wet” symptoms (diarrhoea, vomiting or bleeding) that spread virus in the
environment. The potential for nosocomial transmission is highest within EHUs that have a
rapid turnover of suspect patients.
The only previous study conducted within an Ebola healthcare facility, found no evidence of
environmental contamination at 31 swab sites. Ebola virus was only detected on the 2 visibly
blood-stained positive controls [1]. The reliability of these results may have been reduced how-
ever due to environmental swab collection occurring after environmental decontamination,
delays in sample processing and the interruption of the cold chain.
Epidemiological data supports the possibility of nosocomial transmission through indirect
transmission via surfaces or fomites [10][11]. A study of risk factors for Ebola Virus Disease
(EVD) in Uganda, after controlling for direct contact, found that sharing food or a sleeping
place with a positive case were both independent risk factors for contracting EVD. One patient
in the study was considered likely to have contracted the virus after using a blanket previously
belonging to a positive case [2].
Our assessment was conducted at Connaught Ebola Holding Unit (EHU), a 16-bed facility
situated within Connaught Hospital in Freetown, which is the principal adult medical tertiary
referral hospital in Sierra Leone. The EHU is an adapted medical outpatient wing and was set
up using pre-existing beds and structures (Fig 1); this significantly reduced the cost and lead-in
time for opening the EHU compared to a purpose built facility. The EHU was established over
two days in May 2014, soon after the first EVD cases were reported in the country, staffed by
Sierra Leoneans who were supported by a small team of expatriate colleagues from King’s
Sierra Leone Partnership. As of 1st May 2015, Connaught Hospital EHU had seen 1400 suspect
cases, of which 600 had tested EVD positive using RT-PCR; between May and December 2014
there was a median of 30 admissions per week, of which 64% cases were EVD-positive [12].
In this study we aimed to assess the effectiveness of our routine decontamination protocol
in the EHU by swabbing environmental surfaces and testing for Ebola virus using RT-PCR.
We hypothesised that Ebola virus would be detectable prior to decontamination on surfaces
that had contact with an EVD patient or their body fluids, but that the virus would not be
detectable after decontamination. The study was intended to improve our understanding of
environmental contamination in order to reduce the risk of nosocomial transmission within
the EHU.
Environmental Contamination and Ebola Virus Disease
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Method
The study was designed as an audit of routine decontamination practices at Connaught Hospi-
tal EHU. The unit had a total cleaning staff of 13, with 4 cleaners working in each of the three
shifts. Cleaning staff were initially trained at Connaught Hospital according to the initial WHO
Infection Prevention Control protocols [13] prior to undertaking work inside the unit. They
received regular refresher training every four weeks throughout their employment and every
two weeks following the rapid educational intervention (see Rapid Educational Intervention).
The unit had five regular full cleans every 24 hours, which involved spraying or mopping all
surfaces and floor, changing all bins and emptying patient latrines located by each bed. In addi-
tion, each bedside area was given a “deep clean” after a patient was discharged, consisting of
changing all bed linen and latrine buckets and cleaning of mattress, bedframe, and all bedside
surfaces. The cleaning fluid used was 0.5% sodium hypochlorite reconstituted in fresh batches
six times a day from sodium hypochlorite powder.
The audit sampling procedures were undertaken immediately prior to, and then following,
refresher training of cleaning staff. This allowed standard procedures and training to be evalu-
ated. Cleaning staff were not informed of the audit to ensure routine cleaning standards were
assessed. Three sets of swabs were collected and swab collection took place during a period of
time when confirmed Ebola PCR positive patients were being managed in the EHU. Sample
collection attempted to assess the “dirtiest environment” scenario by collecting samples in the
early morning, before excessive ultraviolet light exposure and before the first daily routine
Fig 1. A schematic representation of Connaught Hospital EHU.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0145167.g001
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cleaning. Initial sample collection (T0) took place immediately after discharge of EVD positive
patients, the area surrounding the bed of the EVD positive patient was then given a “deep
clean”, following the protocol described above. For each swab set, swabs were collected three
times (corresponding to different time periods) at 15 pre-determined locations around the bed-
side of a RT-PCR positive patient, immediately after they left the facility. The three time peri-
ods were:
1. T0: Immediately after departure of an Ebola PCR positive patient, before environmental
cleaning
2. T30: 30 minutes after environmental decontamination of bed and surrounding area
3. T60: 60 minutes after environmental decontamination of bed and surrounding area
Swab sets 1 and 2 were performed prior to the rapid educational intervention and Swab set
3 was performed after the intervention. In addition to the three sets of bedside swabs, an
extended panel of swabs was taken both within the clinical area and outside of the EHU during
set 3, using the same method. Swabs were collected by several of the authors (DY, CSB, PL,
NW) dressed in full Personal Protective Equipment. ∑-Virocult1 swabs, combining a special
foam head with a matching transport medium, were moistened in transport medium then
rubbed over a 30cm by 30cm sampling area. Investigators performed full hand cleaning proce-
dures in 0.5% chlorine solution between samples. Swabs were transferred to the Public Health
England (PHE) laboratory at Kerrytown (transport time of 90 minutes) where samples were
stored overnight at -20°C before undergoing RT-PCR. RT-PCR was carried out according to
PHE standard operating procedures, including a no template control, negative extraction con-
trol and positive control, as validated in the UK and at three reference laboratories in Sierra
Leone. The Trombley™ assay based upon the Ebola Zaire NP assay was used for all runs [14].
The positive threshold used was any CT value<40, the negative threshold was a CT value>40.
Rapid Educational Intervention
After Bedside Swab Set 2, the environmental cleaning team were retrained. 10 members from
various shifts (at least two from each shift) attending a 2-hour cleaning tutorial session. The
tutorial involved practical demonstrations, accompanied by written materials in Krio and
English which covered the correct use of 0.5% chlorine and correct floor and furniture cleaning
techniques.
Following the tutorial, posters were placed around the EHU staff office detailing the correct
environmental decontamination procedures. Refresher training courses were then scheduled
every two weeks.
Ethical considerations
This audit was performed with the approval of the medical superintendent of Connaught Hos-
pital, Dr T.B. Kamara.
Results
173 swabs were collected and processed following the protocol above. There were 16 positive
samples in total. All positive samples were located around the immediate patient bedside
(Table 1). Visible body fluid contamination was present on the mattresses at T0 in all three
swab sets. There was also visible body fluid on the dirty glove at T0. No other environmental
sample sites had visible body fluid contamination. There was no visible contamination present
Environmental Contamination and Ebola Virus Disease
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Table 1. RT-PCR results for swab sets 1, 2 and 3.
Location Time (mins) Swab Set 1 Swab Set 2 Swab Set 3
Floor—head of bed 0 NEGATIVE NEGATIVE NEGATIVE
Floor—head of bed 30 NA NEGATIVE NEGATIVE
Floor—head of bed 60 NEGATIVE POSITIVE CT 37.0 NEGATIVE
Floor—middle of bed 0 NEGATIVE POSITIVE CT 34.6 NEGATIVE
Floor—middle of bed 30 NA POSITIVE CT 32.4 NEGATIVE
Floor—middle of bed 60 NEGATIVE POSITIVE CT 32.7 NEGATIVE
Floor—foot of bed 0 NEGATIVE NEGATIVE NA
Floor—foot of bed 30 NA NEGATIVE NA
Floor—foot of bed 60 NEGATIVE NEGATIVE NA
Bedframe head of bed 0 NEGATIVE NEGATIVE NEGATIVE
Bedframe head of bed 30 NEGATIVE NEGATIVE NEGATIVE
Bedframe head of bed 60 NEGATIVE NEGATIVE NEGATIVE
Bedframe middle of bed 0 NEGATIVE POSITIVE CT 37.0 NEGATIVE
Bedframe middle of bed 30 POSITIVE CT 37.0 POSITIVE CT 35.1 NEGATIVE
Bedframe middle of bed 60 NEGATIVE POSITIVE CT 39.3 NA
Bedframe foot of bed 0 NEGATIVE NEGATIVE NEGATIVE
Bedframe foot of bed 30 NEGATIVE NEGATIVE NEGATIVE
Bedframe foot of bed 60 NEGATIVE NEGATIVE NEGATIVE
Mattress 0 POSITIVE CT 31.2 POSITIVE CT 32.2 POSITIVE CT 37.4
Mattress 30 NEGATIVE NEGATIVE NEGATIVE
Mattress 60 NEGATIVE NEGATIVE NEGATIVE
Latrine 0 POSITIVE CT 36.2 NEGATIVE NEGATIVE
Latrine 30 NEGATIVE NEGATIVE NEGATIVE
Latrine 60 NEGATIVE NEGATIVE NEGATIVE
Wall 0 NEGATIVE NEGATIVE NEGATIVE
Wall 30 NEGATIVE NEGATIVE NEGATIVE
Wall 60 NEGATIVE NEGATIVE NEGATIVE
IV Pole 0 NEGATIVE NEGATIVE NEGATIVE
IV Pole 30 NEGATIVE NEGATIVE NEGATIVE
IV Pole 60 NEGATIVE NEGATIVE NEGATIVE
Bedside Table 0 NEGATIVE NEGATIVE POSITIVE CT 39.2
Bedside Table 30 NEGATIVE NEGATIVE NEGATIVE
Bedside Table 60 NEGATIVE POSITIVE CT 37.8 NEGATIVE
Sharps Bin 0 NEGATIVE NEGATIVE NA
Sharps Bin 30 NA NEGATIVE NEGATIVE
Sharps Bin 60 NEGATIVE NEGATIVE NEGATIVE
Dirty Glove 1 0 NEGATIVE POSITIVE CT 34.9 NEGATIVE
Dirty Glove 1 30 NEGATIVE NEGATIVE NEGATIVE
Dirty glove 2 0 POSITIVE CT 36.9 POSITIVE CT 37.0 NEGATIVE
Dirty Glove 2 30 NEGATIVE NEGATIVE NEGATIVE
Door Handle 0 NEGATIVE NEGATIVE NEGATIVE
Door Handle 30 NEGATIVE NEGATIVE NEGATIVE
Door Handle 60 NEGATIVE NEGATIVE NEGATIVE
Veronica Tap 0 NEGATIVE NEGATIVE NEGATIVE
Veronica Tap 30 NA NEGATIVE NEGATIVE
Veronica Tap 60 NEGATIVE NEGATIVE NEGATIVE
Apron 0 NEGATIVE NA NEGATIVE
(Continued)
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at T30 and T60 after the environmental deep clean at any sample site and therefore Ebola viral
RNA detected at these times points was in the absence of visible contamination.
The first bedside swab set demonstrates Ebola viral RNA in three locations: the patient
latrine; the mattress; and the middle of the bedframe. The middle of the bedframe swabs
detected virus at T30 but not at T0.
The second swab set demonstrates the most environmental contamination, with viral RNA
detected in five locations around the bedside, the floor, the mattress, the bedframe and the bed-
side table. In addition, both gloves used by healthcare workers to help transport the patient to
the ambulance had detectable virus prior to handwashing. Swabs of the bedframe and middle
of the floor remained positive at T60 (i.e. after decontamination). The floor at the head of the
bed and the bedside table gave positive results at T60 but not at T0.
The third data set was collected following the re-training of the isolation unit cleaning staff,
as previously described. The only two positive results were from the mattress and at the
patient’s bedside table at T0. These locations were subsequently found to be negative at T30
and T60 following environmental decontamination.
All of the extended panel of environmental swabs gave negative results (Table 2).
Discussion
The results demonstrate that Ebola virus RNA is detectable in limited areas around the patient
bedside in the absence of visible contamination, in contrast to previous work in the clinical set-
ting [1].
Swab set 1 detected a moderate amount of environmental contamination, followed by no
environmental contamination at T60 and supports the hypothesis that cleaning was effective.
One location was positive at T30, but not at T0; this may have been due to sampling a different
area of the bedframe, displacement of the viral RNA from another location during the decon-
tamination process, or from contamination from an adjacent patient’s bed space between
sampling.
Swab set 2 results suggest the presence of heavy environmental contamination and an inef-
fective decontamination process, with the bedframe and middle of the floor remaining positive
at T60 despite cleaning. Two other locations, the floor at the head of the bed and the bedside
table, had detectable virus after environmental decontamination; again this may be due to sam-
pling variability or displacement of viral RNA. It is possible that the contamination came from
another patient, as there were many positive patients in the unit at this time and the area was
not observed between swab sets. Incomplete decontamination could also be explained by a fail-
ure to effectively prepare this batch of the 0.5% sodium chloride cleaning solution. The greater
amount of environmental contamination could be due to the patient being at a more advanced
stage of the disease, with prominent “wet” gastrointestinal symptoms. This is also supported by
the detectable viral RNA found on both gloves used by clinical staff transferring the patient.
Table 1. (Continued)
Location Time (mins) Swab Set 1 Swab Set 2 Swab Set 3
Apron 30 NEGATIVE NA NEGATIVE
Footnote: Results are shown for samples collected at T0 (immediately after decontamination), T30 (30 mins after decontamination) and T60 (60 mins
after decontamination). Cycle threshold (CT) values were quantiﬁed by the Public Health England (PHE) Trombley assay. NA = not applicable: swabs
were either labelled ambiguously or sites were not sampled in that collection set.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0145167.t001
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Table 2. RT-PCR results for Extended Panel of Swabs.
LOCATION RT-PCR RESULT
Green zone—Desk NEGATIVE
Green zone—document NEGATIVE
Green zone—ﬂoor NEGATIVE
Green zone—chlorine bucket NEGATIVE
Green zone—door NEGATIVE
PPE donning room—boot rack NEGATIVE
PPE donning room—shelves NEGATIVE
PPE donning room—Red Zone Boots side NEGATIVE
PPE donning room—Staff boots underside NEGATIVE
PPE room donning—Staff visor NEGATIVE
Red zone—patient entrance NEGATIVE
Red zone—morgue NEGATIVE
Red zone—lab specimen box NEGATIVE
Red zone Store room—patient clothes NEGATIVE
Red zone patient store—ﬂoor NEGATIVE
Red zone patient store—water NEGATIVE
Red zone store room—medicine NEGATIVE
Red zone store room—sharps bin NEGATIVE
Red zone—chlorine sprayer NEGATIVE
Red zone—stretcher NEGATIVE
Red zone—wheelchair NEGATIVE
Wheelchair post decontamination, after transfer of positive patient NEGATIVE
Waste disposal container NEGATIVE
Medicine tray NEGATIVE
Environmental cleaning runoff liquid 1 NEGATIVE
Environmental Cleaning runoff liquid 2 NEGATIVE
Decontamination/Dofﬁng room—ﬂoor NEGATIVE
Decontamination room/dofﬁng—Bin NEGATIVE
Decontamination room/dofﬁng—wall NEGATIVE
Decontamination room/dofﬁng—handwashing bucket NEGATIVE
Decontamination room/dofﬁng—handwashing bucket veronica tap 1/10 NEGATIVE
Decontamination room/dofﬁng—chlorine footbath NEGATIVE
Decontamination room/dofﬁng—handwashing bucket 1/100 NEGATIVE
Decontamination/dofﬁng room—handwashing bucket veronica tap 1/100 NEGATIVE
Incinerator area—wall NEGATIVE
Incinerator area—door NEGATIVE
Holding tent—benches NEGATIVE
Holding tent—sides NEGATIVE
Holding tent—ﬂoor NEGATIVE
Screening tent—desk NEGATIVE
Screening tent—documents NEGATIVE
Screening tent—patient side rail NEGATIVE
Boots 1 –pre decontamination NEGATIVE
Boots 1 –post decontamination NEGATIVE
Boots 2 –pre decontamination NEGATIVE
Boots 2 –post decontamination NEGATIVE
Boots 3 –pre decontamination NEGATIVE
Boots 3 –post decontamination NEGATIVE
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0145167.t002
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Swab set 3 suggests a modest amount of environmental contamination followed by effective
environmental decontamination. As we had expected, areas of contamination corresponded
with areas of more direct and frequent contact by the patient, including the mattress, bedside
table, and bedframe. The presence of viral RNA on the floor may be a consequence of direct
contact by the patients or due to dispersion during urination, defecation or vomiting, as the
latrine buckets are located on the floor next to the bedside. The uneven, rusted surface of the
bedframes may have led to pooling of the virus and this may have further inhibited effective
decontamination. All mattress specimens were positive at T0, highlighting the need for easily
wipeable, non-absorbable mattresses. No viral RNA was detected on the walls, an area that
could be contaminated by droplet spray directly from the patient. Indeed, apparent displace-
ment of viral RNA from locations negative at T0 and positive at T30 or T60 appeared to occur
in a downwards or lateral direction. The possible displacement of viral RNA to the floor in
swab set 2 suggests the need for regular, effective decontamination of the floor and ideally indi-
vidual soakaways for patient areas. It underlines the importance of chlorine foot baths for boot
decontamination, demonstrated in Table 2, when moving between different areas within the
EHU.
All of the extended panel of environmental swabs in Table 2 were negative. This provides
reassurance that environmental contamination is largely limited to the immediate patient area.
Importantly, no Ebola viral RNA was evident after routine hand-washing. Surfaces in the PPE
doffing room were swabbed after staff that had cared for a positive patient had decontami-
nated, and these swabs were all found to be negative. Three sets of boots worn by clinical staff
caring for the patient were negative. Samples from the wheelchair used to transfer the patient,
also proved to be negative. All storage areas within the clinical area were negative. Run-off liq-
uid from the environmental decontamination process as it left the patient area was also found
to be negative.
Viral RNA was detectable 60 minutes after departure of the positive patient. Further opera-
tional research is needed to examine the time length of viral RNA detection in clinical settings.
Current protocols suggest beds occupied by positive patients should remain empty for 24
hours post departure. During this outbreak there was huge pressure on the limited isolation
bed capacity, particularly from October to December 2014, leading to faster than recom-
mended bed turnover following departure of a positive patient. A greater evidence-base is
needed to determine the safest time for a bed to be reoccupied, allowing for maximum bed
capacity.
Limitations
Swabs were collected from only a small sample area and the number of swab sets was small.
We therefore cannot be certain that reduced viral RNA in swab set 3 was due to improved
decontamination rather than sampling inconsistency. Further repetitions of the audit cycle
would provide more generalizable results. All attempts were made to standardise the sampling
technique including duration and exact location of sampling as detailed in the methodology,
however technical variability in sample collection may be responsible for discordant results at
T0, T30 and T60.
A CT threshold of<40 was selected to define a positive RT-PCR result. This is standard
practice for clinical samples and therefore was deemed appropriate for this study. However,
samples that tested negative may have contained viral RNA at a level below that detected by
the assay. Whilst we hypothesise that sample sites that were negative at T0 and T30 but positive
at T60 reflect transfer of contaminated material during cleaning, it is possible that this instead
reflects a small difference in viral RNA concentration at a sampling site compatible with
Environmental Contamination and Ebola Virus Disease
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sampling variability, at the lower limit of detection of the assay, as detection of viral RNA was
limited by sensitivity of the assay.
In addition, RT-PCR detection of viral nucleic acid does not confirm whether the virus is
viable or not, as it may identify degraded virus, or virus inactivated by chlorine and non-viable
as an infective agent. The very low nosocomial infection rate inside the Connaught EHU dur-
ing this period suggests that actual environmental contamination that posed a risk of transmis-
sion must have also been very low [15]. All specimens collected have been archived, to enable
extended PCR across multiple target sites combined with long range PCR or viral culture to be
undertaken at a later date to assess viability of the virus. This is key to fully exploring the poten-
tial for nosocomial infection within EHUs.
Conclusions
The incidence of nosocomial infection within Ebola healthcare facilities remains contentious.
Health care facilities, with poor levels of infection prevention control have been implicated as
important sites of amplification during filovirus outbreaks [16]. Studies from the current out-
break suggest low rates of nosocomial infection in new build, highly staffed facilities [17]. More
recent publications show even lower positive readmission rates of between 1–3% across EHUs
in Freetown, including Connaught Hospital EHU [15].
These results suggest that regular and effective environmental decontamination can reduce
the presence of viral RNA around the bedside. It is not clear how the presence of viral RNA
relates to transmission potential and further study of this is required, including the use of viral
culture to ascertain whether PCR positive samples contain replication competent virus. How-
ever, our results suggest that if protocols are not closely adhered to, there is the potential for
environmental contamination, which may increase the risk of nosocomial transmission. Envi-
ronmental decontamination should be a priority in preventing nosocomial infection and
thereby preventing healthcare facilities from acting as centres for amplification of the outbreak.
Our results support the use of purpose-designed swabs in viral transport media to assess
surfaces and fomites for environmental contamination. The method offers a valuable tool to
determine the effectiveness of decontamination protocols and the potential of nosocomial
transmission via fomite transmission in the clinical setting. We recommend that regular audits
of environmental contamination become standard practice at all Ebola care facilities during
EVD outbreaks.
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